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ABSTRACT 
 
In the last decade, in lieu of many financial and environmental problems, the 
confidence in a traditional risk management strategy has fallen.  Due to issues facing the 
sustainability of natural resources and globalization of the oil and gas industry, problems 
have become too complex to solve with traditional risk management strategies.  The 
complexities of these problems have resulted in a characterization of the problem as 
“wicked problems.”  Wicked problems are those that arise that are unstructured, 
irregular, and adaptive.  In order to deal with wicked problems, different risk analysis 
strategies have been developed.  These strategies have tried to create a beneficial form of 
risk analysis and management that will be more productive when dealing with wicked 
problems.  Therefore, it should be of benefit to analyze whether broadened risk 
assessment and management principles for wicked problems are more environmentally 
sound and economically effective.  
 Using BP as a case study, this thesis hypothesizes that the execution of 
broadened risk assessment and management strategies will be more effective and 
efficient environmentally and economically.  
This study examines the environmental and economic efficiency of British 
Petroleum (BP) in order to determine if the introduction of a broadened risk assessment 
strategy was beneficial.  Emissions data were compiled from reported emissions records 
on the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) greenhouse gas (GHG) data website 
from the years 2010-2012.  Economic data were gathered through BP’s annual reports 
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from the years 2008-2013.  The data were compared through a series of environmental 
and economic analyses in order to determine the impact of a broadened risk assessment:  
The environmental data were assessed by analyzing the emissions levels and scaling the 
emissions by output of the company.  The economic data were evaluated through two 
average product analyses and a risk savings analysis.  The results showed an overall 
improvement in economic efficiency, and no environmental efficiency improvement 
after the introduction of a broadened risk assessment strategy. 
 
 
  iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would never have been able to finish my thesis research without the guidance 
from my committee members, help from my friends, and support from my family. 
I would like to especially thank my committee chair; Dr. Wyndylyn von Zharen, 
without whom I would not have been introduced to the theories and concepts behind the 
basis for this research.  Her guidance, patience, and ability to provide me with an 
excellent environment to conduct my research have been an influential part the 
completion of my thesis.   
  Thanks go to Dr. Nikolaos Mykoniatis for working with me to develop the 
economic calculations used in my research.  I would also like to express my gratitude to 
Dr. Bruce Bodson and Dr. Mileski for their support and guidance in my research over 
the past year. 
Thanks also go to my friends for supporting me and letting me bounce ideas off 
of them when I needed some extra guidence.  The colleagues, and the department faculty 
and staff have also been an instrumental part in making my time at Texas A&M 
University a great experience.  
Finally, I would like to send thanks to my mother and father for their support, 
and to my fiancé for his patience and encouragement. 
  v 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
BOP Blowout Preventer 
BP British Petroleum 
CH4 Methane 
CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
DWOP Drilling and Wells Operations Practice 
EHS Environmental, Health, and Safety 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
GHG Greenhouse Gas 
HAZOP Hazard and Operability 
MOBED Thousand Barrels of Oil Equivalent Per Day 
NGO Non-governmental Organization 
N2O Nitrous Oxide 
OMS Operating Management System 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PM-2 Project Management of the Second Order 
S&OR Safety and Operational Risk 
SSM Soft Systems Methodology 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although Horst Rittle and Melvin Webber first introduced the concept of wicked 
problems in 1973, it has been relatively absent in research until the last decade (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973).  Some of this more recent research includes Kampf’s paper about risk 
management in the Arctic (Kampf & Haley, 2011) and Pollack’s paper about paradigms 
changing in project management (Pollack, 2007).   
The focus of this research is to bridge the gap of information on wicked problems 
and their assessment.  For example, although there is a growing number of research and 
publications on what wicked problems are and how to determine if a situation is a 
wicked problem, the information about the effectiveness of using broadened risk 
assessment and management strategies is sparse.  In particular, this research will be 
focusing on risk assessment and management practices in the oil and gas industry.  
Therefore, the study will focus on what wicked problems are, how the oil and gas 
industry’s operation may be seen as a wicked problem, and if the use of broadened risk 
assessment and management strategies may be of benefit.      
Due to accessibility of data and prior events within British Petroleum (BP), such 
as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, this research will use BP as a case study.  Although 
this study will focus on BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill as a trigger for the changes in 
the company’s risk assessment, the emissions data and economic data of the company 
are more consistent indicator of environmental and economic efficiency associated with 
risk.  Therefore, BP’s emissions data and economic data will be analyzed in order to 
determine if the implementation of broadened risk assessment and management 
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strategies are economically and environmentally more efficient then traditional risk 
assessment and management strategies.   
Using BP as a case study, this thesis hypothesizes that the execution of 
broadened risk assessment and management strategies will be more effective and 
efficient environmentally and economically.  
1.1 Limitations 
The limitations of this study are mainly due to the fact that it is a present day 
study, with limited data available.  When looking at environmental data, the most 
unbiased source for emissions data are the government records such as the EPA site that 
was used in this study.  However, the records for specific petroleum/natural gas and 
refinery sites only went as far back as 2010.  After contacting the EPA directly, past 
records (before 2010) were not able to be obtained because they were not available 
through the GHG database, and other methods of retrieval such as contacting state 
agencies were not time permitting for the study. Therefore, the study was limited in the 
amount of data that could be compared. 
Another limitation to the study is that it becomes hard to show cause-and-effect 
relationships between the calculations of environmental and economic data and the 
change in risk assessment strategies.  The study is able to show the timing of the risk 
assessment change (2010) and determine if the company has improved in its 
environmental and economic efficiency, which shows important patterns within the 
company.  It can become hard to measure non-static complexities with static procedures.  
Therefore, as this is a correlational relationship, it becomes challenging to prove that one 
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change is actually causing the other.  Although the study tries to account for other factor 
contributions, the complexities make it hard to prove causation.  Other factors such as 
differing state regulations, shifts in business activity and assets, or unexpected market 
fluctuations may play a contributing part.  With this in mind, it must be taken into 
consideration that the results of the study could be due to other factors than risk 
assessment changes. 
1.2 Traditional Risk Assessment 
Risk analysis is the closest thing science has given us to a method for analyzing our 
existential condition of uncertainty and doubt in the face of decisions. 
-Crawford-Brown (1999)  
Risk measures the probability and severity of adverse effects (Haimes, 2009).  
The basis for risk assessment is to determine where uncertainty in a project occurs in 
order for organizations to determine preventative measures (D. Hancock & Holt, 2003).  
It focuses on risk as objective and identifiable rather than subjective (Kampf & Haley, 
2011).  Therefore, the traditional risk assessment uses mathematical and statistical, or 
linear processes (Kampf & Haley, 2011).  The typical way to determine the risk of a 
project is through the use of mathematical models that are used to estimate risk as a 
function of one or more inputs (Thompson & Graham, 1996).  This method reviews risks 
in linear chains of cause and effect over short periods of time (Gray & Wiedermann, 
1999).  Traditional risk assessment places the uncertainties in sequence, which allows a 
weight to be given to the risk according to the likelihood of its occurrence and possible 
impact (D. Hancock & Holt, 2003).  Traditional risk assessment is also very rigid in its 
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classifications of risk (D. Hancock & Holt, 2003).  The use of a traditional method 
disregards, and ignores, any uncertainties arising from systems’ complexities and 
unpredictable behaviors.  
 Traditional risk assessment focuses on the technical and quantifiable risks of an 
organization.  It takes an approach that uses managerial techniques to develop a process 
that revolves around the use of qualitative and quantitative tools (Kampf & Haley, 
2011).  With these techniques, the risks are perceived as always being identifiable and 
manageable (Kampf & Haley, 2011).   
Risks can include financial, physical, and technical areas of the organization 
(Table 1).  In order to address these risks organizations use a variety of methods.  
Traditionally, engineering estimates are used for risks associated with maximum 
foreseeable loss, property expenditures, and expected loss levels (D. Hancock & Holt, 
2003).  Insurance systems have also been implemented for risk associated with product 
or service liability (Meulbroek, 2001).  Financial risk is measured using two main 
calculations; probability distributions linked with policies of risk spreading and risk 
pooling.  First, probability distributions linked with policies of risk spreading measures 
the bearing of risk amongst the spread of multiple investors (Klein, 2000).  Second, risk 
pooling measures the involvement of the company in a series of uncorrelated projects 
(Klein, 2000).  These traditional risk assessment measurement tools are all solution 
based.  They drive for optimal solutions that are sought through careful analysis and are 
linked to changes in the business activity.  By using these tools, the decision making 
process is pushed towards a linear framework and gives clear modes or response.  Risks 
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are therefore “priced” to have tolerable thresholds, and managed with sequential layers 
of decision-making (D. Hancock & Holt, 2003).    
 In an attempt to develop methods that can help in the assessment of uncertainties, 
traditional risk assessment has fallen short.  William Ruckelshaus states, “risk 
assessment is the product of a shotgun wedding between science and the law” (Suter, 
2007).  The seemingly clear solutions that are presented with traditional risk assessment 
can actually make things more complicated through these shortcomings.  For example, 
knowledge about some or all inputs may be lacking in risk models (Thompson & 
Graham, 1996).  Therefore, traditional risk assessment does not reflect how the risks are 
perceived or interpreted by others (D. Hancock & Holt, 2003).  It also fails to convey the 
judgmental and structural assumptions that influence the risk focus (D. Hancock & Holt, 
2003).  Finally, and most importantly, traditional risk assessment does not present all 
realities.  It ignores the influence of cultural, social, environmental, and temporal aspects 
of uncertainty, which leaves some risks to not be addressed properly (Table 2). 
1.2.1 Traditional Risk Assessment of Oil and Gas Problems 
An important example about how traditional risk assessment is used in the oil 
and gas industry is seen through research highlighted in Kampf’s paper about risk 
management in the Arctic.  Kampf and Haley evaluated and analyzed the results of a 
conference in which the risk assessment used was discussed by the oil and gas industry 
(Kampf & Haley, 2011).  The majority of the topics from the conference used a 
traditional risk assessment for different projects in the offshore oil and gas industry.  
Traditional risk assessment was seen in many projects including disaster management, 
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internal risk management, and oil and gas infrastructure (Kampf & Haley, 2011).  A 
main characteristic of these presentations is that they assess the risks by multiplying the 
probability of the risk by the severity of the risk (Kampf & Haley, 2011).  However, this 
is problematic because probability does not always accurately depict the reality of the 
risk (David Hancock, 2010).   
Another issue is that risks are often determined with a linear method which can 
cause problems because human risk decisions are made in a nonlinear fashion 
(Samuelson, 2011).  Human risk can be attributed to two different categories of risk.  
First, the person approach views risk acts as arising from irregular mental processes such 
as inattention, carelessness, negligence, or recklessness (Reason, 2000).  Whereas the 
systems approach views humans as being imperfect and attributes error to be expected 
even in the best of circumstances (Reason, 2000).  In both categories errors tend to fall 
into recurrent patterns, where similar circumstances provoke similar errors (Reason, 
2000).  This concept shows that both categories of risk occur because humans are 
predictably irrational and the errors happen in the same ways over and over again 
(Ariely, 2008).  These behaviors are not random and they are consistently repeated 
which makes them important in improving decision making processes (Ariely, 2008).  
Furthermore, most companies that use a traditional risk assessment tend to view human 
error only from a systems approach category (Reason, 2000).  Therefore, the use of a 
traditional risk assessment becomes inaccurate because it does not account for the person 
approach of human error.    
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More examples of the use of traditional risk management in the oil and gas 
industry are referenced through Schroeder and Jackson’s paper about the failure of 
traditional risk management in the oil and gas sector.  The first example is of an offshore 
oil and gas platform, operated by Shell, located in Russia’s jurisdiction in the Pacific.  
The construction of the platform (Sakhalin II) faced multiple changes in the platforms 
construction costs due to unrealistic estimates of the cost and currency losses (Schroeder 
& Jackson, 2007).  Another problem occurred when disputes arose between Russia’s 
government and the project over environmental violations (Schroeder & Jackson, 2007).  
The inefficiency of the risk management used on the project eventually caused Shell to 
sell most of the operation.  The second example includes the problems associated with a 
refinery-wide turnaround of the entire plant structure.  This project would take the plant 
off-stream for a projected to be more than 500,000 man-hours in a time period of 40 
days.  However, because the risks were never fully understood or addressed, the project 
ended up doubling in time for completion and increased in costs by 30% (Schroeder & 
Jackson, 2007).  
1.3 Wicked Problems 
Wicked problems have multiple characteristics that make them unique.  
Generally, wicked problems are extremely difficult when it comes to addressing cause 
and effect (Batie, 2008).  They are influenced by many differing social and political 
factors, and biophysical complexities (Batie, 2008).  Wicked problems are so complex 
that they can never fully be solved; instead they can only become better or worse (Rittel 
& Webber, 1973).   
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Specifically, when defining a project or an industry as a wicked problem, key 
characteristics must be noted (Fig. 1).  First, they are unique due to the social and 
technical complexity (Kampf & Haley, 2011).  Wicked problems are complex because 
every wicked problem can be considered to be a sign or cause of a different problem 
(Rittel & Webber, 1973).  For example, an oil spill may be the sign of not following 
procedure, regulatory problems, lack of safety, differing opinions in management, poor 
auditing tactics, all of the above, or none of the above.   
Second, wicked problems have constantly changing requirements and constraints 
to any possible solutions (Kampf & Haley, 2011).  Therefore, they cannot be easily 
categorized into specific disciplines (Batie, 2008).  There are no specific categories into 
which wicked problems fit into because there are no solutions that can be developed to 
categorize all wicked problems.  There is no way to define the similarities of each 
wicked problem for comparison because even if two problems seem to be similar, it is 
impossible to be completely certain the wicked problems are one hundred percent 
similar (Rittel & Webber, 1973).     
Finally, wicked problems have multiple stakeholders that have differing views 
and values (Conklin, 2006).  One of the main reasons this concept is important is 
because stakeholder participation is becoming a much larger part of different industries 
due to globalization.  Globalization of industries allows for more wicked problems to 
occur because it increases the social complexities of the industry.  Globalization also 
increases the number of changes and constraints that an industry may face due to the 
increased number of stakeholders (Seijts, Crossan, & Billou, 2010).  Because industries 
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are becoming more globalized, it becomes critical to look at policies that will be able to 
manage and assess risks that arise with projects that may have wicked problems.   
  As different industries become more connected with the rest of the world, more 
stakeholders will continue to get involved.  Wicked problems always occur in a social 
context involving multiple stakeholders whose opinions of the problem can drastically 
differ (Pidd, 2004).  However, a split can occur among the stakeholders when they view 
their contribution as independent of other stakeholders as apposed to viewing the 
multiple stakeholder contributions as being united (Conklin, 2006).  It is important to 
understand that as stakeholders are included in the problem the opinions about what the 
problem is, what the cause of the problems is, and how to tackle the problem become 
larger and more complex.  Multiple stakeholder participation means there will be trade-
offs when dealing with the causes and effects of the problem, and when understanding 
the outcomes (Batie, 2008). 
Many wicked problems raise the concern for systems’ interdependency because 
there are often many different organizations within different situations 
(AustrialianGovernment, 2007).  Organizations exhibit different benefits, and therefore 
mutually dependent relationships arise.  It is important to include the human aspects 
such as judgments, perceptions, and anxieties in a risk assessment because they are 
highly influential in organizational decision-making.  Another area of concern with 
wicked problems is the multiple and varying behavioral influences.  These influences 
can be both internal and external, and can have large impacts on industries and projects.  
External influences include shareholder demands, changes in technology, and changes in 
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environmental regulations while internal influences can include ethical decisions, 
finances, and production (Mckinney, 2014). Therefore it is important to take both human 
aspects and behavioral influences into consideration in risk management, but they are 
often left out because they can be difficult to identify (AustrialianGovernment, 2007; 
Mckinney, 2014). 
Many risks that arise with wicked problems are due to poor communication 
channels, team skills integration, and stakeholder involvement (AustrialianGovernment, 
2007; D. Hancock & Holt, 2003).  This is because an increasing number of industry 
projects deal with communication, not only between and among the project teams, but 
also with project experts and stakeholders from many different organizational cultures 
(AustrialianGovernment, 2007).  These problems are also more likely to occur than 
traditional problems, and they are actually easier to resolve when the proper policies are 
implemented.  For example, a traditional problem such as product failure may not occur 
very often in a well-maintained industry, but when it does, it may take a long time to 
resolve because it can be technically complex (AustrialianGovernment, 2007).  
However, a wicked problem, such as multiple-stakeholder project communication, is 
likely to occur on every project but can be easy to resolve if it is managed properly. 
When dealing with problems that may arise during a project or in industry, one 
author has characterized categories associated with the problem.  Different problems can 
fall under the categories of tame, messy, and wicked.  Tame problems fall on the 
opposite side of the spectrum than wicked problems, with messy problems falling 
somewhere in between the two extremes (Batie, 2008) (Table 3). 
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Tame problems are not necessarily simple, as they can be technically complex, 
but tame problems have simple and linear relationships that have a clear beginning and 
end point; tame problems can be solved through data gathering and solving each 
constituent part (AustrialianGovernment, 2007).  Messy problems are a bit harder to 
define because they deal with the complexities of interrelated problems that may arise 
within a project; as well, messy problems are puzzles, they are not solved, but the 
complexities can be resolved (David Hancock, 2010).  Wicked problems are those that 
are complex, adaptive, and interactive (Kampf & Haley, 2011).  Wicked problems are 
different from messy problems because they introduce a social aspect to the problem.  
They have multiple stakeholders that bring a human aspect to the problem.  The 
uncertainties that arise due to the human behavior aspect allow for wicked problems to 
be more complex than messy problems (AustrialianGovernment, 2007).  This means the 
wicked problems are constantly changing and have no definitive statement of the 
problem (AustrialianGovernment, 2007; David Hancock, 2010).   
In order to separate what characterizes a tame, messy, and wicked problem King 
describes four different problem types (King, 1993): 
Type I: Known outcomes + fixed sequences = deterministic 
Type II: Known outcomes + known probabilities = statistical or stochastic 
Type III: Known outcomes + unknown probabilities = uncertainty 
Type IV: Unknown outcomes + debatable issues = emergence 
Traditional risk assessment typically assumes that problems are tame, or Type I 
and Type II problems.  Therefore, if the outcomes, sequences, and probabilities are 
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known, then traditional risk assessment may be a productive way of determining risks.  
However, because projects and industries are becoming more interconnected with 
outside stakeholders, have social and technical complexity, and have constantly 
changing requirements, most problems fall under Types III and IV.  The increasing 
complexities of projects are leading to a larger number of problems becoming Type III, 
or messy problems.  However, messy problems are not as large of a concern because, if 
specific boundaries or conditions for the industry or project can be agreed upon, there 
can be a single solution (David Hancock, 2010).  Therefore, the main concern for 
industries and projects is that of wicked problems (Type IV).   
Because wicked problems do not have a definitive problem, or a problem that 
can be easily determined, there cannot be a definitive solution (AustrialianGovernment, 
2007).  Wicked problems arise as a result of what the project is trying to achieve (David 
Hancock, 2010).  Unfortunately, traditional project management focuses on Type I and 
II problems, and underestimates the potential of Type III and Type IV problems (Kampf 
& Haley, 2011).  According to Bentley and Wilsdon (2003), “in these complex 
circumstances, people and organizations have to become adaptive...the question is 
whether policy-makers can embrace this shift in perspective” (Bentley & Wilsdon, 
2003).  In order to fully address risks associated with wicked problems, a broadened risk 
assessment needs to be developed that can adapt to complex situations and focus on the 
variety of problems that can arise from wicked problems.  
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1.4 Wicked Problems of the Oil and Gas Industry 
The projects associated with the oil and gas industry fall into the category of 
being a wicked problem because they share the characteristics of wicked problems.  The 
oil and gas industry is very unique due, in part, to their social and technical complexities.  
First, there are the social issues that are centered around oil and gas.  These issues 
include human rights; revenue management; environmental; health and safety (EHS); 
governance; and corruption (Wagner & Armstrong, 2010).  The vastness of the social 
issues that face oil and gas only add to the complexities of the industry.   As well, 
drilling in general is technically complex.  Because drilling has expanded to include 
offshore sites, the complexities of the engineering and response and rescue have become 
even more difficult to control (Kampf & Haley, 2011).   
The oil and gas industry also faces the characteristic of dealing with constantly 
changing requirements and constraints to solutions.  These constraints include 
challenging weather predictions, industry demand, and lack of data. Global climate 
change is one constraint that the oil and gas industry must face. Because the weather can 
be hard to predict, engineers must constantly look for ways to improve the rigs in order 
for them to be suitable for weather inconsistencies.  With the change in climate 
happening at an accelerated pace, it can be a challenge to keep the industry moving in 
the right direction (Kampf & Haley, 2011).  It is also important to note that the weather 
conditions will have different effects depending on where the drilling takes place.   
For example, drilling will have more risk if it is located in a cold offshore 
environment than it would have in a warm landlocked environment (Goodyear, Clusen, 
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& Beach, 2012).  In a colder environment, such as the Arctic, there are many factors that 
can increase the risk associated with drilling.  First, the Arctic’s extreme weather and 
freezing temperatures make the oil behave differently.  In lower temperatures oil takes 
longer to disperse, it is near impossible to clean up if underneath ice, and it would linger 
for longer periods of time if spilt (GreenPeace).  The movement of sea ice in the Arctic 
also poses a complex problem, as it introduces the presence of icebergs that need 
constantly moved (GreenPeace).  Finally, the remote location of the Arctic is a problem 
because if an accident were to occur, it would take longer to get the proper personnel to 
the scene. 
The demand of the industry also keeps pushing drilling to go further offshore, 
and into deeper waters.  In order to keep up with the demand of the industry, engineers 
are forced to modify rig structure so drilling can occur in deeper waters (Faucon, 2013).  
Another issue that arises is the lack of sufficient baseline and monitoring data (Kampf & 
Haley, 2011).  Without proper understanding of certain drilling site system dynamics, it 
can be difficult to predict the consequences of drilling and the affects on the 
environment (Kampf & Haley, 2011).  To begin with, onshore and offshore drilling may 
differ in how they affect the environment.  For example, offshore drilling can create 
various forms of pollutions such as drilling muds, brine wastes, and deck run off, that 
may be different from onshore drilling pollution(Oceana, 2012).  On the other hand, 
onshore drilling may affect humans due to the proximity certain sites may have to 
communities (WildernessSociety, 2010). 
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Finally, the oil and gas industry includes many different stakeholders that may 
have conflicting views and values. Stakeholders can include employees, customers, 
suppliers, the local community, and even future generations.  It is important for an 
industry, company, or even a project to ensure that the interests of a wide range of 
stakeholders are taken into consideration (Fremond, 2000).  In order to approach a 
diverse group of stakeholders important principles to consider include transparency or 
full disclosure of information, accountability that ensures that management is effectively 
overseen, fairness in terms of unbiased treatment, and responsibility that ensures that the 
corporation fulfills its societal roles (Fremond, 2000).  Specifically, oil and gas 
stakeholders range from governments, business partners, shareholders, suppliers to 
communities, employees, and customers(Looney, 2012).  Each of these groups may be 
interested in the oil and gas industry for different reasons because they are all seeing the 
industry from differing perspectives, and working towards different goals.  Therefore, 
they may all have differing views and values.  With such a large range in stakeholders, it 
can be difficult to use one system to address all of the differing views and opinions. 
Wicked problems are unstructured, interactive, adaptive, and complex 
(AustrialianGovernment, 2007).  These problems are socially and technically complex, 
they are constantly changing, and they have multiple stakeholders with different views 
and values.  After discussing the oil and gas industry, it is understandable why it can be 
defined as a wicked problem.  Therefore, the implementation of risk assessment systems 
that will address the wicked problems associated with oil and gas projects and industries 
is a key step in improving oil and gas risk management.  
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1.5 Implementation of a Broadened Risk Assessment to Address Wicked Problems 
In order to fully address the risks that are associated with the wicked problems in 
a globalized industry, it is important to understand that a broadened risk assessment 
needs to replace the traditional risk assessment approach.  As previously mentioned, 
traditional risk assessment follows a technical approach.  It develops management that is 
chronologically driven, and solves problems in a linear way.  Broadened risk assessment 
attempts to develop a management system that looks for continuous improvements 
instead of solutions to problems.  Wicked problems are never fully solved, and there is 
no best approach to dealing with a wicked problem. Unlike traditional risk assessment 
that focuses on the technical and quantifiable risks such as financial, physical, and 
technical, a broadened risk assessment is more adaptive to allow it to address wicked 
problems.  A broadened risk assessment uses multiple management and assessment 
theories, and it can also focus on the cultural, social, temporal, and environmental risks 
(Table 2).  Although there may be other approaches to address wicked problems, 
systems thinking is being focused on here because it is the method that is addressed most 
in the literature. 
Wicked problems call on a system that is continually adapting to risks that never 
stop changing.  The importance of a broadened risk assessment approach is that it 
focuses less on solving problems and finding a definitive answer and seeks to 
continually come up with new problem-solving techniques.  The process does not end 
until the industry runs out of time, money, energy, or some other resource (D. Hancock 
& Holt, 2003).  This is a particularly important concept.  A wicked problem is always 
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changing due to its complexities and multitude of components.  Therefore, a risk 
assessment that seeks to address a wicked problem must also never stop changing.  
There must be multiple techniques that always continually search for solutions (Harvey, 
2012).    
Systems thinking was introduced in 1950 by Ludwig vonBertalanffy.  He 
explained that the emergence of ‘systems’ has changed in scientific research because 
people have begun to study systems as an entity instead of a assortment of parts 
(vonBertalanffy, 1950).  It allows for the various risk assessment systems to be 
integrated in order to tackle the variety of risks from a wicked problem, and it allows for 
a better understanding of the wicked problems that are associated with a globalized 
industry.  The systems view allows for risk assessment to combine multiple tools and 
processes in order to deal with complexities that traditional linear techniques do not 
provide (Kampf & Haley, 2011).  
By using systems thinking, the risk assessment can be broadened because it calls 
upon many different approaches to be combined in order to account for the large number 
of risks that wicked problems trigger.  In order to better understand systems thinking, a 
few of the methods used to tackle some wicked aspects of a project are addressed.  The 
industry can include systems such as Actor Network Theory, Soft Systems Methodology 
(SSM), Concept Mapping, Complexity Theory, and Critical Systems Thinking in order 
to better assess possible risks (Fig. 2).   
As an introduction to one of the theories, SSM is an interpretive approach that 
encourages viewing organizations from a cultural perspective. SSM tries to evaluate as 
  18 
many different options as possible by learning from different sensitivities that exist in 
each of the people involved (Maqsood, Finegan, & Walker, 2003).  The human aspects 
of an industry are essential in determining the characteristics of the organization 
(Finegan, 2010).  Therefore, SSM is tries to tie in the factors that may be caused due to 
human interactions.  As another example, concept mapping is a way of representing 
different ideas and topics while linking them all in a web (Liles, 2011).  Concept 
mapping can be useful because it can help to show possible relations between the 
complexities of a wicked problem (Fig. 3). 
 A useful example of how some of these different theories can be used in 
different management techniques is the Project Management of the Second Order (PM-
2).  This management system is a newer project management paradigm that calls for the 
use of systems thinking.  It uses multiple management systems such as SSM or Concept 
Mapping, simultaneously in order to manage wicked problems that arise from complex 
projects (Kampf & Haley, 2011).  Therefore, PM-2 is able to utilize systems thinking 
approaches because it addresses complexities in industry by using multiple management 
and risk assessment systems in order to tackle wicked problems. 
The use of a broadened risk assessment can also be used to build decisional 
matrices that help to identify continually improving efficiencies within the project 
(vonBertalanffy, 1950).  These matrices are dependent on the skill and commitment of 
the industry’s employees at many different levels.  Systems thinking based management 
relies on the subsystems of an industry or project, and employees at different levels are 
an important and valuable subsystem (Ingram, 2014).  Therefore, it is important to 
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include employees of all different levels such as work groups, departments, and 
individual employees. This method requires a self-critical awareness and evaluation at 
an organizational level, and it requires a constant revision of expectations at a personnel 
level (Ingram, 2014).  Employees need to be encouraged to contribute more than simply 
doing what they are told to do.  Employee innovation and awareness need to become a 
key factor in everyday project and organizational analysis (D. Hancock & Holt, 2003).   
Wicked problems are complex, ever changing, and call upon a strategy that can 
adapt.  Broadened risk assessment uses techniques such as systems thinking and 
continual improvement to address wicked problems.  Overall, by applying various 
techniques in order to broaden a risk assessment, an industry can work to manage the 
complexities of wicked problems.   
1.6 Case Study:  British Petroleum (BP) 
As a multinational company, BP is the sixth largest energy company by 
production, and the fifth largest company in the world by revenues (Oil&GasIQ, 2014).  
The company has operations in all areas of the oil and gas industry including 
exploration, distribution and marketing, production, and refining.  Although BP is 
headquartered in London, its largest division is BP America based in the United States. 
1.6.1 Risk Assessment Issues 
Since 2005, BP has been under consistent scrutiny due to different risk 
management issues and the resulting problems that have occurred.  Although the 
company may have faced smaller risk issues before 2005, comparatively little attention 
was brought to the company prior to this time.  However, in March of 2005 the Texas 
  20 
City refinery experienced a large explosion that caused 15 deaths and 23 injuries (Mauer 
& Tinsley, 2010).  After that incident, BP’s Thunder Horse oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico 
nearly sank during Hurricane Dennis in July of 2005 due to human error and design 
weakness in the ballast system (Roberto, 2011).  In 2006, BP’s Prudhoe Bay oil pipeline 
experienced a major leak which resulted in over 200,000 gallons of oil to be spilled 
(Roach, 2006).  The leak was due to a failure, by the employees, to maintain the pipeline 
over the year (Roberto, 2011).  Also, in 2006, BP’s Toledo, Ohio refinery was fined $2.4 
million by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for safety 
violations (Roberto, 2011). 
On April 20, 2010, BP experienced its most critical risk management issues with 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.  This accident occurred on the 
Macondo rig which was rented by Transocean from BP (Kaufman & Winig, 2012).  Due 
to the extent of the litigation that followed this accident, this study has focused on a 
group of case studies and trial evidence in order to develop accurate information 
pertaining to the spill (Kaufman & Winig, 2012; Roberto, 2011; Rogers, 2010; 
Rotemberg, 2012; SPAIntegrityManagement, 2007).   
Leading up to the accident, there were signs that there may be future problems.  
In mid-March of 2010, Lloyd’s Register Group was hired as a risk management 
organization in order to assess the rig’s safety.  The risk assessment report found that 
workers were concerned with equipment maintenance, safety practices on the rig, and 
pressure from managers off the rig (Kaufman & Winig, 2012).  The report found that 
many of the systems to be in poor or bad condition which lead to the shut down of the 
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rig for five days to address 383 issues (Kaufman & Winig, 2012).  At the end of the shut 
down, seven issues remained but BP had decided they were “not serious enough” to keep 
the rig shut down (Kaufman & Winig, 2012).    
After the accident, a BP report names eight key elements that could have 
prevented the oil spill (Fig. 4).  First, the cement job of the well did not adequately stop 
the oil and gas from reaching the well pipe casing (Rogers, 2010).  There was also 
failure in the cement and valve at the bottom of the drill (Rogers, 2010).  Halliburton, the 
cement company, tested the cement’s stability before use, but the results suggested 
uncertainty (Roberto, 2011).  Investigators concluded that BP may not have reviewed the 
cement laboratory results carefully before deciding to use the cement (Roberto, 2011).  
Another error was found with the readings of the pressure test.  The pressure test was 
used in order to examine the integrity of the casing and the cement job (Roberto, 2011).  
During the test, the line was blocked which kept any fluids from escaping (Rogers, 
2010). The workers misread these results to show everything to be working correctly 
(Rogers, 2010).   
Since the pressure test was misread, when oil and gas started flowing up the well, 
it went unnoticed for forty minutes (Rogers, 2010).  Gas in the Macondo Prospect well 
where the Deepwater Horizon was drilling gushed upward, causing the drilling mud to 
eject into the air (Roberto, 2011).    From this point, oil and gas was swept onto the rig 
when it should have been directed overboard (Rogers, 2010).  As the oil and gas flooded 
the rig surface, a cloud of gas spread around the rig underneath the deck (Rogers, 2010).  
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Also, the rig’s fire prevention system failed, allowing the ventilation systems to transfer 
the gas in to the engine rooms (Rogers, 2010).   
Finally, the failsafe blowout preventer (BOP), a piece of safety equipment used 
to seal the well shut in case of an emergency, had been damaged during drilling 
(Kaufman & Winig, 2012).  The fire had prevented the remote shut down of the BOP 
from working, and the automated system also failed The fire had prevented the remote 
shut down of the BOP from working (Rogers, 2010).  As flames shot 250 feet in the air, 
workers were not able to do anything to save the rig or prevent the oil from spilling 
(Roberto, 2011).  The rig burned throughout the following day and the Macondo well 
continued to spill oil into the Gulf of Mexico for almost three months (Roberto, 2011).   
BP immediately sent skimming vessels and aircraft to the rig after the explosions 
(Rotemberg, 2012).  In first attempts to control the leak, BP placed a large funnel on top 
of the explosion area to try and capture spewing oil (Rotemberg, 2012).  This method 
had proved successful in shallow waters, but low temperatures at the seafloor delayed 
any further progress to capture the oil (Rotemberg, 2012).  The next effort focused on 
clogging the leaking pipe.  BP attempted to shoot a mix of material into the pipe and also 
worked to drill a relief well parallel to the Macondo well (Rotemberg, 2012).  However, 
before the relief well was ready BP successfully capped the Macondo well by placing a 
new BOP on top of the old one (Rotemberg, 2012).  After the cement that flowed into 
the pipe through the new BOP solidified BP removed both BOPs (Rotemberg, 2012).   
The pipe was capped almost 5 months after the explosion, on September 19, 
2010 (Kaufman & Winig, 2012).  Despite response efforts, the events of the Deepwater 
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Horizon oil spill caused 11 deaths, 16 injuries, and an estimated total of 4.9 million 
barrels of oil to be leaked (NationalResponseTeam, 2011).  Currently, the Deepwater 
Horizon spill is the largest offshore oil spill in U.S. history.  On September 4, 2014 New 
Orleans judge Carl Barbier ruled that BP should be held 67% responsible for the 
disaster, while Transocean should shoulder 30%, and the cement firm Halliburton should 
hold 3% (BBC, 2014).   
Through the court evidence from the Deepwater Horizon spill trials, the risk 
assessment has been documented.  Prior to the Deepwater Horizon spill, and even prior 
to the Texas City accident in 2005, BP used a technical approach for its risk assessments.  
Specifically, the Macondo project implemented the GoM Risk Management System 
(SPAIntegrityManagement, 2007).  The GoM Risk Management System is a form of 
traditional risk assessment because it places the uncertainties in sequence, and it leads 
management to be chronologically driven which solves the problem in a linear way (Fig. 
5). 
1.6.2 Risk Assessment Changes 
During the Offshore Technology Conference in April of 2012, the Executive 
Vice President of Developments for BP, Bernard Looney, explained the changes BP has 
made subsequent to the Deepwater Horizion spill, in order to enhance safety and risk 
management including: 
1. Implementation of the Safety and Operational Risk Organization 
(S&OR) team;  
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2. Enhancement of education for the company employees and the 
company’s contractors; and  
3. Implementation of the 26 recommendations made in the Bly Report. 
These three changes include ways to tackle the problems associated with wicked 
problems (Table 4).  First, the implementation of the S&OR team promotes adaptability, 
which is key in addressing the constant changes of wicked problems.  Next, the 
enhancement of the education structure works to address the differing opinions of 
multiple stakeholders.  Finally, the implementation of the Bly Report recommendations 
addresses shareholder input, continual improvement and continuity, and adds experts 
who are apt to deal with complex situations. 
Through the S&OR team, BP will be able to assign experts to continuously 
improve standards as problems arise and change.  This is important because it addresses 
the need for continual adaptation that wicked problems introduce.  The S&OR team was 
designed and given the authority to stop unsafe operations, and to provide technical 
expertise for all of the operations leaders (Looney, 2012).  The team will also utilize it’s 
knowledge base to design and update standards (Looney, 2012). Overall, the main goals 
of the S&OR team is to provide technical expertise in order to enable production to 
proceed in a safe, reliable, and compliant manner (Looney, 2012). 
Enhancement in education structure is important because helps to lessen the 
problems associated with multiple stakeholders.  If all of the stakeholders are being 
trained in one location, they will be less likely to exhibit risky behaviors due to 
differences in training.  In order to enhance education, the company has implemented the 
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new training program through the establishment of a Global Wells Institute (BP, 2013a).  
The Global Wells Institute allows for training of BP employees and BP contractors to be 
at the same time and in one location (BP, 2013a). During the training, the well site 
leaders are tested through a seven-part system that assesses their capabilities to control 
basic well incidents and also tests their ability to prevent an incident from happening in 
the first place (BP, 2013a).   
 Finally, BP has implemented all of the recommendations that were made in the 
Bly Report, an internal inquiry report of the Deepwater Horizon spill.  Mark Bly, the 
Executive Vice President of S&OR for BP, compiled a report of the incident through 
rigorous investigation by an internal team (M. Bly, 2010).  As a result of the 
investigations, the Bly Report came up with 26 recommendations for BP.  These 
recommendations were based on eight key findings and were to apply to BP, its 
contractors, and its service providers (M. Bly, 2010).  Overall, the recommendations 
focused on two main areas (M. Bly, 2010):  
1. Drilling and Well Operations Practice (DWOP) and Operating Management 
System (OMS) implementation; and  
2. Contractor and service provider oversight and assurance 
  With DWOP and OMS implementation, Bly recommended four areas of 
improvement.  These sections included procedures and engineering technical practices, 
capability and competency, audit and verification, and process safety performance 
management (M. Bly, 2010).  Each section includes multiple sub-sections that specify 
procedures that need to be taken and areas that need to be regulated.  One of these 
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subsections included training programs with both employees and outside stakeholders.   
Specifically, the training programs were focused on advanced deep water well control in 
order to develop better response capabilities and a better understanding of well control 
conditions (M. Bly, 2010).  However, the main importance behind the new training 
programs was that they brought in current employees and outside stakeholders in order 
to expand the amount of people involved in the procedures.  Another important 
subsection concentrated on continuous reviews for consistency, rigor, and effectiveness 
of risk management processes (M. Bly, 2010).  In order to accomplish this step, action 
plans that address areas that need strengthened and definitions of minimum requirements 
were put into place (M. Bly, 2010).  This subsection is particularly important because it 
includes continual improvement.  Including steps towards improvement and continuity 
of procedures focuses a key factor in addressing with wicked problems.  Finally, the 
report included subsections that focused on the development of formal subsea 
engineering certifications for personnel involved with maintenance and modification of 
the control systems, implementation of auditable integrity monitoring systems that 
include continuous assessments, and the creation of central expert teams in order to 
provide assurance of the integrity of the BOP control systems (M. Bly, 2010).  These 
subsections conform to a broadened risk assessment by improving the qualifications of 
the personnel dealing with the complexities associated with wicked problems. 
Bly also included four recommendation areas that focus on the contractor and 
service provider oversight and assurance.  These included cementing services assurance, 
well control practices, rig process safety, and BOP design assurance (M. Bly, 2010).  
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One subsection of this focus area included conducting a review of the quality of the 
services provided.  This subsections goal is to develop effective communication and 
mitigation improvements with associated providers’ services (M. Bly, 2010).  Another 
subsection concentrated on establishing redundancy and reliability by requiring drilling 
contractors to implement reinforced repeated audits of risk management processes (M. 
Bly, 2010).   This is important because it makes the contractors implement a process that 
allows them to change their procedures with the constantly changing factors of a wicked 
problem.  Finally, the subsections also included regular hazard and operability (HAZOP) 
reviews in order to improve rig safety standards, and strengthening of BP’s minimum 
requirements for drilling contractors in order to prevent miscommunication between BP 
and the drilling contractors (M. Bly, 2010).    
The implementation of the 26 recommendations and the other safety and risk 
management changes meant new practices, new training, new verification processes, and 
new expectations (Looney, 2012).  The implementation would help to improve risk 
management for issues that arise in industry working practices, training and competency 
assessment, and limitations among operators, contractors, and service providers (M. Bly, 
2010).  Overall, the changes BP made in order to enhance safety and risk management 
developed “broader systematic responses and recommendations associated with possible 
broader industry issues” (M. Bly, 2010).   
BP has also shown improvements in risk assessment through S&OR updates.  In 
2011, Mark Bly made a presentation on the S&OR updates showing the teams 
improvements (Mark Bly, 2011).  The presentation included a new continual approach to 
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risk management that covered numerous levels of focus areas (Fig. 6).  BP’s 
sustainability review from 2013 also showed extended focus on more stakeholder 
relationships (BP, 2013b).  These relationships have been expanded to include 
employees, shareholders, governments, regulators, industries, contractors, partners, 
communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and customers (Fig. 7). 
1.7 Summary:  Indications of Improvement 
The analysis of the trial evidence and investigation reports of the Deepwater 
Horizon spill have provided evidence of BP’s risk management procedures from before 
and after 2010.  Trial case evidence from the Deepwater Horizon spill has indicated the 
use of traditional risk management procedures prior to 2010, and the incident reports 
such as the Bly report and the Offshore Technology Conference speech have shown that 
BP has implemented a broader risk management system after 2010.  The broader system 
that has been implemented since 2010 follows a systems thinking approach.  It works to 
bring in and understand the impact outside stakeholder opinion, it understands that 
possibility of human error, it works to improve communication channels, and it 
continuously tries to improve procedures in order to prepare for issues that arise with 
wicked projects. 
BP has shown clear recognition of the need for implementing a broadened risk 
assessment through top-level management implications for its importance.  This study 
recognizes that it is relying on BP’s reports and publications.  For purposes of the study, 
the push from top management for implementation of broadened risk assessment 
strategies is being recognized as enough approval, of said strategies, to show indications 
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of a broadened risk assessment through the rest of the company.  Therefore, analyses can 
be done to see if the attempts of implementing a broadened risk assessment have 
translated into data that show environmental and economic efficiency associated with 
risk. 
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2. METHODS 
2.1 Emissions Analysis 
Emissions data were analyzed because, although the introduction of a broadened 
risk assessment in BP may have been triggered by an oil spill, the emissions of the 
company are an underlying continual measurement for the improvement in a company’s 
environmental risk.  The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was a large disaster that allowed 
for a major change to take place in the company.  However, due to the rarity of a large 
oil spill, it becomes less accurate to use the spill as an indicator for environmental risk.  
Therefore, the company’s continual emissions are a more consistent measure of the 
environmental efficiency attributed to risk. 
Due to the availability of information, the emissions analyses were conducted for 
the years 2010-2012.  The database could not be expanded further into the past because 
emissions data was not recorded before 2010 in the current EPA software.  The site used 
for the studies’ database provided emissions data from the years 2010, 2011, and 2012; 
Emissions data were compiled from reported emissions records on the EPA greenhouse 
gas (GHG) data website (EPA, 2012).   The EPA website allows emissions data to be 
searched by site location and type of facility.  The data were narrowed down to twenty-
four petroleum/natural gas and refineries that BP operates in the U.S.  Twenty-four sites 
were selected in order to remain consistent with the number and type of sites data-based 
per year.  The twenty-four individual sites were also alike in production in order for the 
emissions data to be kept to similar scales.  The study focused on only U.S. BP sites in 
order to compare emissions differences in locations that were operating under the same 
  31 
environmental regulations.  Once all of the sites’ data were compiled, the data were 
further narrowed down to each specific site. Further research narrowed the emissions 
gases by type.  The gases were recorded for their corresponding year by total Carbon 
Dioxide (CO2), total Methane (CH4), and total Nitrous Oxide (N2O) emitted by each BP 
petroleum/natural gas and refinery plant in the U.S. (Table 5-7).   
After all of the raw emissions data were compiled, the totals for each gas per year 
and the number of sites assessed in each year were recorded (Table 8). The data for the 
total BP production in the U.S. and the total emissions of BP in the U.S. were compiled 
in order to scale the greenhouse gas emissions by output (Table 9-10).  All of the data 
compiled allowed for two separate environmental calculations to be run in order to 
determine the environmental efficiency of using a broadened risk assessment.   
The first calculation showed the total emissions of CO2, CH4, and N20 from the 
years 2010-2012 (Fig. 11).  The second calculation recorded environmental efficiency by 
scaling the emissions’ data by output (Fig. 12).  The analysis of the calculations looked 
at the changes in emissions from the time of the risk assessment changes (2010) to 
current practices (2012). 
2.2 Economic Analysis 
 Economic data were analyzed as an indicator for economic risk in terms of the 
company’s cost.  Three calculations were conducted in order to provide multiple 
economic indicators in terms of risk.  The first two indicators were calculated through 
average product analyses in order to determine economic efficiency.  Economic 
efficiency was defined for the purpose of this study as a company’s output in terms of 
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their production and a company’s input in terms of their capital or labor.  The production 
and operating costs or labor of the company was then used in order to conduct two 
average product analyses for the years of 2008-2013 (Fig. 8).  The third calculation 
determined BP’s annual savings in terms of risk reduction (Fig. 9).  The economic 
analyses assess data from both the U.S. entities of the company, and for the company as 
a whole in order to provide multiple comparisons of the company’s cost associated with 
risk.  Although the study is still focusing on a U.S. comparison, adding the total 
economic data allows for another dimension that may help to substantiate or compliment 
the U.S. findings. 
The economic analyses were conducted from the years 2008-2013 in order to 
provide an accurate calculation of economic efficiency from before the risk assessment 
changes (2008-2010); through the risk assessment change (2010); to the most current 
practices (2010-2013).  The database for the economic efficiency calculations could be 
expanded further than the environmental efficiency calculations due to availability of 
data.  The data for the average product analyses and the savings analysis were extracted 
from BP’s annual reports for the years 2008-2013 (Fig. 10).  Specific numbers that were 
documented were BP’s sales and operating revenues, profit (loss) for the year, operating 
costs, profit (loss) for the year attributed to BP shareholders, capital expenditures and 
acquisitions, total number of employees, production (barrels of oil), production (ft.3 of 
natural gas), total production (MBOED), production ($ million), and EHS fines and 
penalties (Table 11). 
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 Once all of the data were compiled for each year, each average product analysis 
(Fig. 8) was calculated in order to determine the trend of the economic efficiency for BP 
from 2008 to 2013.  Average Product Analysis 1 used the company’s production, which 
was the total amount of barrels of oil and natural gas per year, and divided it by the total 
operating costs for the same year.  Average Product Analysis 2 also used the company’s 
total production for the year but divided it by the total labor, or employees, for the same 
year.  By using two different approaches to the average product analysis, the data are 
able to show a clearer picture of the economic efficiency because more than one 
calculation of economic efficiency can be analyzed and compared. 
The savings analysis was also calculated in order to compare the dollar amount 
saved by the company when a new risk assessment strategy was put in place in 2010.  
By focusing the savings strictly on costs associated with risk, the data are able to show 
the money spent due to risks.  In order to calculate the savings analysis, EHS fines and 
penalties were subtracted from the total production ($ million) (Fig. 9).  By targeting 
specific costs (EHS fines and penalties), the saving analysis will only measure costs the 
company faced from risk assessment problems.  
By compiling data that relates specifically to risk assessment, and comparing 
both of the economic analyses and the savings analysis, it is possible to see trends of the 
company that relate to the change in risk assessment strategies.   
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3. RESULTS 
3.1 Environmental Analysis 
 The graph of emissions shows the total of each gas type from twenty-four 
petroleum/natural gas and refinery sites in the U.S. (Fig. 11).  This graph records the 
metric tons CO2, CH4, and N2O per year.  The data indicate that CO2 levels are the 
highest with emissions around nineteen million, and steadily increase over the three-year 
period.  CH4 levels follow a similar pattern as CO2, increasing steadily over the three 
years, with levels peaking at about 150,000 metric tons. N2O levels decreased slightly, 
with levels consistently around 2,400 metric tons. 
 As stated earlier, emissions levels were used as a consistent indicator of the 
company’s environmental risk.  Therefore, in order to record environmental efficiency, 
the data from the emissions levels were scaled by output.  The environmental analysis 
was calculated by dividing total emissions by the production in the U.S. (Fig. 13).  The 
CO2 and CH4 analyses showed a steady increase throughout the three-year period.  The 
N2O analysis was consistent in its levels, with a slight increase over the three years. 
3.2 Economic Analysis 
 Average Product Analysis 1 showed the data from the calculation of production 
divided by operating costs for the years 2008-2013 in total and U.S. specifically (Table 
12).  The calculations showed two distinct sets of declines in economic efficiency 
around 2010 for BP, both in total and in the U.S. (Fig. 13).  The economic efficiency 
increased from the years 2011-2012 for the U.S., and then showed another decrease from 
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2012-2013. However, in total, the economic efficiency stayed consistently low from 
2010-2013. 
 The Average Product Analysis 2 graph showed another economic analysis that 
still uses the company’s production, but looked at labor instead of capital (Fig 14).  The 
calculation was conducted by dividing the production by the number of employees 
(Table 13).  Both in total and U.S. trends followed the same pattern in this analysis.  In 
2009, the economic efficiency dropped dramatically, and sharply increased from 2010-
2011 until it steadied in 2012, forming a V-shaped pattern. 
 In order to calculate the company’s savings from the time before (2008-2010) 
and after (2010-2013) adapting a different risk assessment a calculation was made where 
risk costs were subtracted from production (Table 14).  The savings analysis graph 
showed the trend in savings that are attributable to risk costs from the years 2008-2013 
(Fig. 15).  The data showed that the company’s savings dropped heavily from 2008 to 
late 2010.  The savings started to rise again from mid 2010, and have continued to rise 
through 2013.   
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
4.1 Summary of Results 
Overall, the data compiled and the calculations conducted in this study lead to 
five analyses.  Two of the analyses add to the information pertaining to the 
environmental efficiency, and three of the analyses add to information about the 
economic efficiency of the company. These analyses give information that help to make 
conclusions about the economic and environmental efficiency of BP attributable to risk 
assessment and management changes.  The environmental efficiency is measured from 
the time of the risk assessment changes in 2010 to current emissions in 2012, and the 
economic efficiency was measured from before the risk assessment changes occurred in 
2008 through the changes in 2010 to current practices in 2013.   
The emissions data (Fig. 11) give accurate data about the emissions levels for the 
twenty-four BP petroleum/natural gas and refineries in the U.S.  The total 
emissions/production (Fig. 12) data allows for the emissions data to be scaled by the 
output of the company.  The average product analyses (Fig. 13 & 14) help draw 
conclusions about the economic efficiency of BP, both in the U.S. and for the company 
as a whole.  Finally, the savings analysis (Fig. 15) adds to the economic analysis by 
showing how much the company was able to save from before the Deepwater Horizon 
spill through 2013. 
The first environmental analysis (Fig. 11) patterns of emissions levels show an 
overall consistent increase per site over the years 2010-2012.  Emissions levels scaled by 
production have also consistently increased per site over the three-year period (Fig. 12). 
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When concentrating on the economic analyses, the data from the Average 
Product Analysis 1 (Fig. 13), which scales the data by operating costs, show a drop in 
economic efficiency around the time of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  After the spill, 
the company is able to increase its economic efficiency quite quickly from 2011-2012 in 
the U.S., but it drops again from 2012-2013.  The company as a whole has a drop in 
economic efficiency from the years 2009-2010 and was not able to increase its economic 
efficiency through 2013.   
When Average Product Analysis 2 is scaled by labor (Fig. 14), the economic 
efficiency follows a similar pattern for both the U.S. and for the company as a whole.  
Average Product Analysis 2 shows a significant drop in economic efficiency during the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill with a quick increase in the years following the spill.  The 
economic efficiency stabilizes in 2011, and remains constant.  Finally, the savings 
analysis (Fig. 15) shows a significant drop in savings associated with risk from the year 
2008 until the time of the Deepwater Horizon spill.  The company savings associated 
with risk increased in 2010 and has continued to increase through the current years. 
4.2 Conclusions 
In order to determine overall conclusions for the analyses conducted in this 
study, it is important to determine what the analyses are representing.  From records 
compiled from trial evidence of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, it can be concluded that 
BP adopted new risk management approaches that fit a broadened risk assessment 
model.  The application of new risk management practices was put in place after the 
2010 Deepwater Horizon spill in order to develop “broader systematic responses and 
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recommendations associated with possible broader industry issues” (M. Bly, 2010).  
This is important because BP is part of a “wicked industry.”  Wicked industries deal 
with broader risks, and therefore, need to use broadened risk management assessment 
strategies.   
Although the Deepwater Horizon spill was an important trigger for the change of 
risk assessment strategies within BP, the emissions data and company costs associated 
with risk are a more consistent indicator of environmental and economic efficiency.  The 
emissions and economic data were compiled in order to determine if the environmental 
and economic efficiencies improved once BP adopted new broadened risk management 
and assessment strategies.  Therefore, by looking at the environmental and economic 
data analyses for the years before and after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the study 
can draw conclusions that show how the company reacted, environmentally and 
economically, with the new broadened risk management and assessment strategies that 
focus more on the wicked problems. 
When focusing on the environmental efficiency, BP’s emissions levels increased 
overall.  Therefore, when all of the analyses for environmental efficiency are compared, 
a conclusion is drawn that the BP has not been able to lower emissions levels even with 
a change in risk assessment. These results may be due to a number of different factors 
that could effect emissions.  First, differences in state regulations may affect emissions 
levels per site.  Also, sites may be monitored and measured differently which could have 
an effect on emissions levels.  Another factor may be due to the inability for the risk 
assessment to have permeated to the local level, which is the level that emissions are 
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recorded at within BP.  Finally, fluctuations within BP’s business activity and assets 
could also affect emissions levels. 
The economic efficiency analyses were able to show a bit more information 
because data were available for a larger interval of time. BP showed a drastic decrease in 
economic efficiency around the time of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  The company 
also showed improvement in economic efficiency in the years following the accident.   
When scaling the analysis by operating costs, the company as a whole was not 
able to increase its efficiency (Fig. 13).  Although the broadened risk management and 
assessment strategies were applied both to the company as a whole and in the U.S., the 
U.S. was able to improve after the introduction of the new broadened risk management 
and assessment strategies (Fig. 13).  However, the economic efficiency in the U.S. 
decreased again in more current years.  The fluctuations in the economic efficiency 
when scaled by operating costs could be due to the large changes in the operations 
associated with BP’s structure.  With the change of BP’s risk assessment strategies, it 
may take more time to see these implementations through data. 
When the analysis was scaled by labor, BP shows again the expected pattern of 
decrease during the years of the Deepwater Horizon spill.  However, BP was able to 
quickly increase its economic efficiency after the years of the spill, both for the company 
as a whole and in the U.S. (Fig. 14).  Both economic efficiency analyses, scaled by labor 
and by operating costs, show that BP decreased in economic efficiency in 2010 during 
the Deepwater Horizon spill, but the introduction of the new, broadened risk 
management and assessment strategies may have helped the company to increase its 
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economic efficiency in the years following the accident, and may have continued to 
improve its economic efficiency in the current years. 
Finally, the savings analysis helps to show an overall company pattern of savings 
associated with risk from years 2008-2010, before the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, until 
2013.  This analysis showed that BP had large savings declines from years 2008-2010.  
BP hit an all time low with savings attributed to risk in 2010 (Fig. 15), but after the 
implementation of the broadened risk management and assessment strategies, the 
company has experienced a consistent increase in savings from 2010 through 2013.  By 
comparing all of the analyses for economic efficiency, the study shows that BP was able 
to increase overall in economic efficiency after the introduction of new broadened risk 
management and assessment strategies. 
4.3 Future Research 
There are many studies that could be done in the future in order to contribute to 
this type of research.  The most obvious would be to continue the data collection for this 
company as more data become available.  These patterns that have been developed only 
measure three years after the main accident in BP.  With environmental cases, trials can 
proceed far in to the future.  Even in 2014 there have been new rulings on the 2010 
Deepwater Horizion spill that have found the company to be ‘grossly negligent’, which 
may increase the amount of money paid in civil penalties (BBC, 2014).  Therefore, if the 
data were collected for the next few years, more patterns may emerge that would 
continue to add to the understanding of the effectiveness of a broadened risk assessment.   
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It may be of benefit to look into other oil and gas companies in order to 
determine where these broadened practices are being used, and see why they are not 
being adopted more frequently if, in fact, that is the case.  This study has shown that 
broadened risk assessment strategies may be helping to improve BP, both 
environmentally and economically, but it is still in need of further research to determine 
if the adoption of these practices is beneficial. 
Finally, it would also be interesting to assess a broadened risk assessment with 
different sectors of the energy industry.  This study was conducted as a tool to 
understand the effectiveness of a broadened risk assessment on a specific energy sector.  
By looking at other sectors in the energy industry, the toolbox can continue to grow and 
add to the knowledge of the environmental and economic impacts of using broadened 
risk management and assessment strategies to address wicked problems. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Figure 1. Key Characteristics of Wicked Problems (Finegan, 2010) 
 
 
Figure 2. Systems Thinking Approach (Finegan, 2010) 
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Figure 3. Concept Map (Liles, 2011) 
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Figure 4. 8 Key Elements of the Deepwater Horizon Spill (Rogers, 2010) 
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Figure 5. GOM Risk Management System (SPAIntegrityManagement, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. S&OR Update: Continual Risk Management (Mark Bly, 2011) 
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Figure 7. Expanded Stakeholder Focus (BP, 2013b) 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Average Product Analyses 1 & 2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Savings Analysis 
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Figure 10. Index of Data 
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Figure 11. Total Emissions in US Graph 
 
 
Figure 12. Total Emissions in US/Production 
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Figure 13. Average Product Analysis 1 Graph 
 
 
Figure 14. Average Product Analysis 2 Graph 
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Figure 15. Savings Analysis Graph 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 1. Traditional Risk Areas (D. Hancock & Holt, 2003) 
    
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Wicked Risk Areas (D. Hancock & Holt, 2003) 
 
 Organization Project Team Personal 
Financial Currency or interest fluctuation 
 
Client budget 
changes 
 
Underestimate 
consumables 
Salary/benefits 
  
Physical 
  
Poor offices weaken 
public image 
 
Untidy site 
 
 
Team split between 
site and office 
 
Health 
Technical 
  
Errant auditing system 
Lack of modular, 
pre-assembly 
suppliers 
 
Faulty machinery 
 
Failure to link 
competencies 
with tasks 
 Organization Project Team Personal 
Cultural  Conflicting 
strategic aims 
within joint 
venture 
Personnel within 
organizational 
‘silos’ 
Multi-tasking team 
with differing 
competencies 
Impact of work upon 
family 
Social Electoral change Protestor and/or 
security sensitivity 
Accountability to 
other teams 
Aligning activity with 
personal ethics 
Temporal New technology 
speeding up 
industry 
‘clockspeed’ 
Unspecified client 
need meaning 
unclear critical 
path 
Unrealistic project 
‘milestones’ 
How activity 
promotes/hinders 
career path 
Environmental Exhaustion of non- 
renewable raw 
material 
Contaminated site Pollution requires 
use of unfamiliar 
protective gear 
Exposure to hazards 
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Table 3. Summary of Tame and Wicked Problems (Batie, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  60 
Table 4. How BP's Risk Assessment Changes Are Associated with Wicked 
Problems 
Risk	  Assessment	  Change	  Made	  by	  BP	  
Wicked	  Problem	  Associated	  
with	  Risk	  Assessment	  
Change	  
How	  Risk	  Assessment	  
Change	  Addresses	  
Associated	  Wicked	  
Problem	  
Implementation of S&OR Team 
1. Constantly changing Promotes adaptability 
by assigning experts to 
monitor need for 
change 
2. Impossible to fully define 
the problem 
Enhancement of Education Structure 1. Multiple stakeholders with differing opinions 
Addresses differing 
opinions by training 
multiple stakeholders 
together 
Implementation of Recommendations 
from Bly Report 
1. Multiple shareholders  
New training programs 
that involve the 
participation of 
multiple shareholder 
input, and work to 
improve 
communication 
between shareholders 
2. Never stops being a 
problem 
Continuous reviews 
and audits to address 
effectiveness, 
consistency, and rigor 
of risk management  
3. Complex  
Improves the 
qualifications of 
personnel dealing with 
complexities 
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Table 5. 2010 BP U.S. Emissions Data 
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Table 6. 2011 BP U.S. Emissions Data 
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Table 7. 2012 BP U.S. Emissions Data 
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Table 8. Total Emissions/Year 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Total Production 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Total Emissions/Production in U.S. 
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Table 11. BP Economic Annual Report Data 
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Table 12. Average Product Analysis 1 
	  
Average	  Product	  Analysis	  1	  
	  
2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  
Total	   0.01	   0.02	   0.01	   0.01	   0.01	   0.01	  
US	   0.02	   0.10	   0.10	   0.06	   0.08	   0.05	  
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Average Product Analysis 2 	   Average	  Product	  Analysis	  2	  	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  Total	   0.04	   0.05	   	  0.03	   0.04	   0.04	   0.04	  
U.S.	   0.02	   0.04	   	  0.04	   0.03	   0.03	   0.03	  
 
 
 
 
Table 14. Savings Analysis 
	  
Savings	  Analysis	  ($	  million)	  
	  
2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  
Total	   365,838	   180,449	   143,836	   298,280	   346,775	   343,735	  
 
 
 
 
 
